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Income Taxation-Denial of Deduction of Business Expenses
Incurred in Personal Litigation
P's overriding concern in his divorce litigation, because of
California community property law and his wife's claims, was the
protection of the assets of his three corporations against these
claims. P sought to deduct eighty percent of the legal fees incurred
in this litigation as expenses incurred for the conservation of
property held for the production of income. The Commissioner
contended that all of the expenditures were personal and as such,
non-deductible. The government appealed from a Court of Claims
ruling allowing the deduction. Held, reversed. The legal expenses
incurred in resisting the wife's claims stemmed from the marital
relationship and not from P's profit seeking activities. United
States v. Gilmore, 83 Sup. Ct. 623 (1963).
This case is of importance primarily because of the perception
displayed by the Court in formulating a rule, in regard to business
deductions allowed by INT. RFv. CODE. of 1954 § 212(2), which is
easily understood and applied.
The rule, as stated by Mr. Justice Harlan, is that the characterization as "business" or "personal" of the litigation costs of resisting
a claim depends, not on the resulting consequences to the taxpayer's
income-producing property for failure to defeat the claim, but
rather on whether the claim arises in connection with the taxpayer's
profit-seeking activities. In Lykes v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 118
(1952), the Court stated that the test of deductibility was whether
or not the expenses were reasonably and proximately related to
the management, conservation and maintenance of income-producing property-that is, "deductibility turns wholly upon the nature
of the activities to which they relate." This is the case that provided
the rationale for the Gilmore rule.
Prior to the decision in the principal case there was a definite
split of authority in the lower courts concerning the test to be used
in construing the INT. Rzv. CODE of 1954 § 212(2). This section is
substantially the same as IT'r. RFv. CODE of 1939 § 23 (a) (2), as to
the deductibility of expenses incurred in resisting claims affecting
the taxpayer's income-producing property. One line of cases has
followed the decision in Baer v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 646 (8th
Cir. 1952), which reached exactly the opposite conclusion from that
reached by the Court in Lykes v. Commissioner, supra, although
both courts based their decisions on the same test. The distinction
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made in those cases following the rationale of the Baer decision, is
that, though the reason for the litigation is personal, the portion of
the costs attributable to the protection of income-producing property
in connection with that litigation should be deductible as a business
expense under the INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 212(2). United States
v. Patrick, 288 F.2d 292 (4th Cir.), rev'd 83 Sup. Ct. 618 (1963);
Owens v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1959); Deem v.
United States, 209 F. Supp. 369 (D. Colo. 1962).
The cases following the rule as set forth in Lykes v. Commissioner, supra, have not made the distinction between personal and
business expenses which have arisen because of personal litigation,
and consequently have disallowed deduction of any part of the
expenses which arose because of the personal litigation. Ditmars
v. Commissioner,302 F.2d 481 (2d Cir. 1962). These decisions were
predicated on the assumption that INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 212
allows deduction of a business expense only when incurred during
some profit-seeking activity, and that the cost of protecting one's
assets as a result of personal litigation is not, actually, a profitseeking activity. United States v. Patrick, supra. The Gilmore rule,
as applied in the Patrick case, was extended to include those business expenses incurred in forestalling a personal claim. The Court
stated that it would be unsound to make deductibility turn on the
nature of the measures taken to forestall a claim rather than the
source of the claim itself.
The opinions in the principal case and in United States v.
Patrick,supra, are almost a replay of the opinion in Lykes v. Commissioner, supra, which in turn simply reiterated a rule of construction established by the Court in 1927. Kornhauser v. United
States, 276 U.S. 145 (1927).
The only distinct difference in the rule in the principal case and
that stated in Lykes v. Commissioner, supra, is that the Gilmore
rule has stated in clear, understandable words that business expenses
incurred as a result of personal litigation are not deductible under
§ 212(2) of the INT. BEv. CODE of 1954.
In retrospect, the holdings seem easily predictable, and the
previous attempts by the lower courts to give the husband a break
on his legal expenses now, unfortunately, have no possible legal
home.
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